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INTRODUCTION
Unless a landowner manages to strike gold or oil on his or her
property, the worth of that land “is not in the dirt itself,” but in how he
1
or she may develop it. Because the permitted use provides the land with
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, in
English, Drew University, 2007. The author thanks her friends and family for all their
support these past three years.
1
Donald R. Daines, Hanging On to What You Got, HILL WALLACK LLP,
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value, local zoning classifications play a huge part in determining the
2
value of any particular piece of property. Zoning designations are also
“the foundation upon which an owner’s right to use the property is
3
based.” In contrast, the overarching goal of zoning is to advance the
common good and general welfare of the entire community, and
sometimes the common good is not to permit the most advantageous
4
economic use of land. As a result, the property rights of the individual
and the interests of the community often come into conflict during the
5
course of land development.
In balancing these two conflicting interests, courts are no longer
likely to accept a mere recitation by a municipality that a zoning
ordinance reasonably relates to the police power because it promotes the
6
public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Today, courts are more
likely to examine closely the particular purposes behind each zoning
7
action to determine whether it truly achieves those stated purposes. One
recent example of this increased judicial scrutiny of municipal zoning
8
action is Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South Brunswick,
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a zoning
amendment adopted by the Township was not only arbitrary and
9
capricious, but also impermissible inverse spot zoning. While the
dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on the judicially created
doctrine of inverse spot zoning, others praised the decision for
promoting rational and professional zoning and for breathing new life
into individual property rights by adding to the arsenal available to
landowners looking to defeat a municipality’s downzoning of their

http://www.hillwallack.com/web-content/news/articles_040309.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2011).
2
See id.
3
Id.
4
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS § 34.01(1) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter
OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES] (quoting Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n v.
Schmidt, 83 S.W.3d 449, 455 (Ky. 2001)).
5
See generally Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls: Balancing
Public and Private Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629 (1999).
6
OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES, supra note 4.
7
Id.
8
Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008).
9
Id. at 187. Inverse spot zoning occurs when a municipality “arbitrarily singles out a
particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.” Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978).

WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE)

518

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/5/2011 7:40 PM

Vol. 35:2

10

property.
This Note recognizes that the doctrine of inverse spot zoning was
originally developed in response to the problems of zoning’s earlier era,
11
and prior to the enactment of New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law.
However, it asserts that the majority in Riya Finnegan actually
transformed the doctrine in a way that improves New Jersey land use
jurisprudence by providing greater clarity and promoting better and
more accurate decision-making by the courts. Part I provides a brief
description of the inverse spot zoning doctrine and traces its presence in
New Jersey case law prior to the Riya Finnegan decision. Part II
supplies an overview of New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law and the
Riya Finnegan decision. Part III examines the historical context of
inverse spot zoning and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of
the doctrine in Riya Finnegan. Finally, Part IV discusses the important
competing interests at stake in a zoning challenge and explains the
balance struck by the New Jersey Supreme Court between the broad
zoning power granted to municipalities under the Municipal Land Use
Law and judicial intervention.
I.

WHAT IS INVERSE SPOT ZONING?

This Part explains the features of inverse spot zoning both
generally and throughout New Jersey case law. The first subpart not
only defines inverse spot zoning, but also compares it to traditional spot
zoning and clarifies the meaning of its usage throughout this Note. The
second subpart describes and traces its presence in New Jersey case law
prior to the Riya Finnegan decision.
a.

In General

Essentially, spot zoning is the zoning or rezoning of a particular
piece of property or “spot” in a manner considerably different from
12
surrounding properties. The term’s usage can produce some confusion
10

See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 204; Daines, supra note 1; see also Editorial, Zoning
Law and Master Plans, N.J. L.J., June 26, 2009.
11
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -163 (West 2009). Section 40:55D-62 of New
Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law states that the governing body of a municipality “may
adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in whole or part is
inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate” the Master Plan, provided that there is
majority approval and that the body’s reasoning for the inconsistency is “set forth in a
resolution and recorded in its minutes” upon adoption of the ordinance. Id. § 40:55D-62(a).
12
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, SPOT ZONING § 38A.01(1) (Patrick J. Rohan &
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13

because courts employ it in two different ways. In the narrower, legal
sense, spot zoning is a designation used by courts to condemn a zoning
14
action as per se invalid. However, when courts use the term in the
broader, descriptive sense, it simply refers to the practice of rezoning a
particular parcel of a land for a purpose that is significantly more or less
15
restrictive than the surrounding zoning. The act of spot zoning is only
invalid if a court finds it to be unjustified in light of the totality of the
16
circumstances. Because New Jersey courts hold that zoning is
automatically void if found to be spot zoning, this Note will focus on
17
the term in its legal sense.
The typical spot zoning case begins when a municipality complies
with a landowner’s request to develop his or her land in a manner barred
by the current zoning scheme by passing an ordinance rezoning the
18
property. A court will generally invalidate the zoning action as spot
zoning if it “is designed to relieve a particular property from applicable
zoning restrictions for the benefit of a particular property owner or
specially interested party, to the detriment of other owners in the
19
vicinity, and the community as a whole.”
Some courts differentiate between inverse or reverse spot zoning
20
and traditional spot zoning. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
21
York City, the United States Supreme Court defined inverse spot
zoning as “a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular
parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring
22
ones.” Thus, the difference between the two types of spot zoning is
that in the classic spot zoning case, a particular lot is singled out for
Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter SPOT ZONING].
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., “Spot Zoning” — A Spot that Could be Removed from
the Law, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 117, 121 (1995).
18
SPOT ZONING, supra note 12.
19
Id. (citations omitted)
20
See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 250-51 (1954)
(invalidating an amendment which in effect granted a variance as “spot zoning”). Cf. Seiber
v. Laawe, 33 N.J. Super 115, 126 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1954); Guaclides v. Borough of
Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super 405, 412 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). Both courts
indicated that they would hold spot zoning invalid but did not find it in those particular
cases because similarly situated property was treated alike.
21
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22
Id. at 132.
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preferential treatment, while in the case of inverse spot zoning, a
23
particular lot is singled out for zoning that is more restrictive. For
example, courts have found impermissible inverse spot zoning where
municipalities rezoned a particular parcel from multifamily to singlefamily residential, commercial to residential, central business to
highway commercial, heavy to light industrial, or industrial to
24
residential.
Unlike traditional spot zoning, these types of amendments usually
lead to economic disadvantage rather than advantage for the owner of
25
the rezoned property. A court declares a zoning ordinance void as
inverse spot zoning when it is “confiscatory or discriminatory to the
owners of the subject properties without bearing a substantial
26
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.”
Courts generally uphold a zoning amendment if it furthers the public
interest and its benefits to the community outweigh the harm caused to
the individual property owner, or if the municipality enacts the
amendment as part of a comprehensive zoning plan intended to advance
27
the general welfare and land use uniformity. In other words, a
municipal zoning action that discriminates against an individual
property owner must serve a police power purpose that outweighs the
burden on the individual’s property rights or that furthers the
community’s comprehensive land use plan.
b.

New Jersey Case Law

New Jersey case law defines traditional spot zoning as “the use of
the zoning power to benefit particular private interests rather than the
28
collective interests of the community.” The case law stresses that it is
29
“the antithesis of . . . planned zoning.” The case law further states that
the test is whether the zoning ordinance at issue was enacted “with the
purpose or effect of” advancing a comprehensive zoning scheme or
whether it was devised simply to benefit a particular lot through relief

23

Reynolds, supra note 17, at 119.
SPOT ZONING, supra note 12 § 38A.06(2).
25
Id.
26
Id. § 38A.06(1).
27
Id. § 38A.06(3).
28
Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 195 (2008)
(quoting Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 18 (1976)).
29
See Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 134 (1965).
24

WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

5/5/2011 7:40 PM

INVERSE SPOT ZONING
30

521

from a general zoning regulation.
Inverse spot zoning does not appear much throughout New Jersey
case law. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s most extended discussion of
inverse spot zoning took place in 1974 in Petlin Associates v. Township
31
of Dover. In that case, a portion of a zoning district permitting retail
uses included the plaintiff’s property, but after the plaintiff filed plans to
32
build a department store, the municipality altered the zoning. Because
the new zoning designation for the plaintiff’s property did not allow
33
retail uses, the plaintiff challenged the rezoning. The court held the
zoning amendment invalid as inverse spot zoning, emphasizing “that no
real consideration was given to how the property would fit into an
integrated and comprehensive zone plan” and that the zoning change
was contrary to the recommendations of the Township’s planning
34
engineer.
35
Three months later, in Odabash v. Mayor & Council of Dumont,
the court struck down a zoning amendment proscribing housing
36
construction for the use of more than two families in any zone. As
applied to the plaintiff’s property, the amendment made the property
37
“an isolated island in the midst of apartment and business uses.”
Although the Appellate Division characterized the zoning action as
inverse spot zoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in affirming that
part of the decision, simply focused on the amendment’s arbitrary and
38
unreasonable nature when applied to the plaintiff’s parcel.
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court has found some
zoning revisions evidently aimed at preventing a proposed development
to be permissible. For example, in response to local opposition to a
plaintiff’s proposed Home Depot store, the municipality in Manalapan
39
Realty, L.P. v. Township Committee of Manalapan enacted a zoning
amendment that prohibited retail stores “engaged in the sale of lumber
or building materials or storing, [from] displaying or selling materials
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Petlin Assocs. V. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327 (1974).
Id. at 328-30.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Odabash v. Mayor & Council of Dumont, 65 N.J. 115 (1974).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123-25.
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366 (1995).

WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE)

522

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/5/2011 7:40 PM

Vol. 35:2

outside a completely enclosed building” within the zone encompassing
40
plaintiff’s property. The Appellate Division held that the amendment
was plainly not inverse spot zoning because the amendment affected not
just one tract of land, but effectively every zoning district in the
41
township. In order to be inverse spot zoning, the zoning revision would
42
have to inflict “an arbitrary, unique burden on one tract of land.”
Although the inverse spot zoning issue was not before the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the majority declared that the Township’s decision to
ban the retailing of building materials could further legitimate goals and
could not “categorically be adjudged an arbitrary and unreasonable
43
exercise of the zoning power.”
II. NEW JERSEY’S MUNICIPAL LAND USE LAW AND RIYA
FINNEGAN
This Part provides an overview of New Jersey’s Municipal Land
Use Law and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Riya
Finnegan. The first subpart reviews the statutory language pertinent to
the Riya Finnegan decision, as well as the statute’s relevant legislative
history. The second subpart provides a summary of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Riya Finnegan.
a.

New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use Law
44

The New Jersey Legislature enacted the Municipal Land Use Law
(hereinafter “MLUL”) in 1975. The law was designed to be “a
comprehensive codification and substantial revision” of the state’s
45
several statutes related to municipal land use and building regulation.
40
Id. at 373 (quoting MANALAPAN, N.J., LAND USE AND DEV. ORDINANCE § 130.94
(1991)).
41
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 272 N.J. Super 1, 13-14
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
42
Id. at 14.
43
Manalapan Realty, 140 N.J. at 385-86 (1995) (quoting Zilinsky v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 105 N.J. 363, 371 (1987)).
44
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -163 (West 2009).
45
S. County and Municipal Government Comm.: Statement to S. No. 3054, 1975 Leg.,
2nd Sess. 1 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Statement to S. No. 3054]; see also Public Hearing on S.
No. 3054 Before the S. County and Municipal Government Comm., 1975 Leg., 2nd Sess. 2
(N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (statement of Sen. Martin L. Greenberg, Member,
S. County and Municipal Government Comm.) (noting S. No. 3054 codified five basic land
use statutes enacted at different times: Planning Acts, Zoning Enabling Acts, Official Map
and Building Act, Plan Unit Development Act, and the Regional Planning Act).
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A former president of the New Jersey State League of Municipalities,
the entity that drafted the legislation, emphasized that New Jersey had
not yet updated the enabling act it passed in 1928, and that numerous
46
changes had occurred in land use since that time. He also stressed that
the legislation’s drafters, in carefully examining all land use case law
since 1928, hoped to correct many of the pitfalls that led to disputes
47
faced by municipalities and courts prior to the law’s enactment.
Another speaker at the public hearing highlighted that, at that time,
a variety of municipal land use ordinances and actions were under legal
48
attack. He also emphasized that, although the MLUL “would not
eliminate all such litigation, the bill is structured to minimize the
potential for such litigation” and to provide guidance to municipal
49
officials and their consultants. One of the principal standards that
would be effectuated by the MLUL was the need for stricter conformity
50
between zoning ordinances and the Master Plan.
Section 62(a) of the MLUL grants the governing body of each
51
municipality the power to zone. It states that “after the planning board
has adopted . . . a [M]aster [P]lan,” a municipality’s governing body
52
“may adopt or amend a zoning ordinance.” In essence, Section 62(a)
presents municipalities with two options in enacting or amending a
zoning ordinance. Under the first option, all provisions of any zoning
ordinance, amendment, or revision must be “substantially consistent
with . . . the [M]aster [P]lan or designed to effectuate” the elements of
53
the plan.
The statute’s second option declares that “the governing body may
adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in
whole or part is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate” the
elements of the Master Plan, “but only by affirmative vote of a majority
46

Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 3 (statement of George Hagermeister, Chairman,
N.J. State League of Municipalities’ Land Use Study Comm.).
47
Id. at 4.
48
Id. at 9 (statement of Stewart M. Hutt, Gen. Counsel, N.J. Builders Ass’n.).
49
Id. at 9-10.
50
Statement to S. No. 3054, supra note 45, at 5.
51
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2009).
52
Id. The MLUL also effectively grants zoning boards the power to rezone a parcel by
granting a use variance. See id. § 40:55D-70. “A use variance allows a landowner to use
property in a manner inconsistent with permitted uses in the zone in question, such as
allowing a commercial establishment to locate in a residential zone.” ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS, VARIANCES § 43.01(3)(a) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009).
53
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a).
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of the full authorized membership of the governing body . . . .” In
addition, the governing body must “set forth in a resolution and record[
] in its minutes when adopting such a zoning ordinance” its reasons for
55
deviating from the Master Plan. Section 89 obligates municipalities to
reexamine and update their Master Plans at least every six years in order
56
to keep their zoning current.
b.

Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South Brunswick

The plaintiff in Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Township Council of South
57
Brunswick owned a sizeable piece of land located in South Brunswick,
58
New Jersey along a commercial highway. According to South
Brunswick’s Master Plan, adopted in 2001 after a two-year study of
land uses and traffic, the plaintiff’s parcel was zoned as Neighborhood
59
Commercial. The Neighborhood Commercial or C-1 Zone, which also
encompasses much of the land along the same highway as the plaintiff’s
property, includes retail service businesses, professional offices, and
60
multi-story mixed-use developments. Unlike the plaintiff’s land, most
of the other parcels in this zone were already developed with “retail
service businesses and professional offices, including multi-story
61
mixed-use development.”
In 2003, the plaintiff submitted a site plan application to the
Planning Board showing plans to build “one professional and two retail
62
buildings, one of which was to be a drugstore.” Although the plaintiff
fully complied with the district’s zoning requirements, neighboring
63
residents objected to the plan. They petitioned the Township Council
to rezone the plaintiff’s parcel as Office Professional, another type of
64
zone only found in one distinct part of town. The troubled residents
highlighted that the area surrounding the plaintiff’s lot was quite
developed and that allowing the plaintiff to go forward with its plan
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id.
Id. § 40:55D-89.
Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of South Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184 (2008).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 188.
Id.
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would lead only to “additional traffic, noise, odor, dust, and pollution.”
The Council then forwarded the issue to the Planning Board for
66
consideration.
Following a public hearing in which representatives of the
disgruntled residents voiced their objections to the site plan, the
Planning Board advised the Township Council to rezone the plaintiff’s
67
parcel. After the Council heard from both the neighboring property
owners and the plaintiff’s representative, it ultimately adopted an
68
ordinance rezoning the plaintiff’s land as Office Professional. In an
accompanying resolution, the Council declared that although the
rezoning of the parcel was “inconsistent with the Master Plan, . . . it
[would] significantly protect the health, safety and welfare of the
69
residents and motorists in the area.”
More specifically, the resolution stated that the rezoning would not
only “prevent an intensification of traffic congestion at the intersection”
where the plaintiff’s property is situated, but also thwart an increase in
the volume of vehicles through a neighboring residential development
70
and near an elementary school and park. The resolution also stressed
that existing development in the area in line with the C-1 Zone already
resulted in an abundance of retail and commercial establishments
71
similar to those proposed by the plaintiff. It further highlighted that the
rezoning would be proper because professional offices produce little
noise, light, or odor, and tend to be open for more limited hours than
72
businesses, thus tending to generate less traffic. The resolution lastly
maintained that offices function well as a transition “between
commercial and residential [uses] because of [their] intermediate
73
intensity.”
After the rezoning, the plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that the
zoning amendment “was inconsistent with the Master Plan, was
arbitrary and capricious, and constituted impermissible inverse spot

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE)

526

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/5/2011 7:40 PM

Vol. 35:2

74

zoning.” The trial court found that the Township complied with the
“technical requirements” of Section 62(a) of the MLUL, but invalidated
the zoning amendment because it found the ordinance to be arbitrary
75
and capricious. The trial court alternatively held that the zoning
amendment constituted impermissible inverse spot zoning since the
Township solely rezoned the plaintiff’s property and there was nothing
indicating that the revision would advance a comprehensive zoning
76
plan.
The Appellate Division, after applying a different standard of
77
review, held that the ordinance was not arbitrary or capricious, and that
the resolution accompanying the rezoning decision sufficiently
conformed to the MLUL by providing the Council’s reasoning for
78
rezoning the property inconsistently with the Master Plan. The panel
also rejected the trial court’s inverse spot zoning decision by
distinguishing the case law on which that court relied and finding that
79
the parcel’s large size warranted the dissimilar treatment. The New
80
Jersey Supreme Court then granted certification to review the case.
In a majority opinion written by Justice Hoens, the court first noted
that the governing body clearly complied with the technical
requirements of the MLUL by forwarding the issue to the planning
board for its consideration and setting forth in a resolution a series of
81
reasons for why it passed the ordinance. The court then proceeded to

74

Id. at 189-90.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 190.
76
Id.
77
In holding that it is insufficient for a municipality to base a decision to rezone solely
on the protestations of neighboring property owners, the trial court cited Cell South of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Windsor, 172 N.J. 75 (2001). Riya
Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 394 N.J. Super 303, 313 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007). The Appellate Division distinguished this decision by emphasizing that the
Board of Adjustment in Cell South was deciding whether to grant an application for a
variance. Id. It characterized this as a “quasi-judicial, adjudicative function” obligating the
Board “to create a record that supported a decision to deviate from established municipal
policy.” Id. at 314-15. In contrast, the Council in Riya Finnegan was performing a “purely
legislative function,” which allowed it, “as a duly elected policymaking body, to rely on the
sentiments of its constituency to formulate municipal policy, including zoning regulations.”
Id. at 314 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 272 N.J. Super 1,
12 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), aff’d, 140 N.J. 366 (1995)).
78
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 190.
79
Id. at 190-91.
80
Id. at 191.
81
Id. at 192.
75
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emphasize that the Township needed to look further in order to
“protect[] the rights of the few when the voices of the many speak more
82
loudly.” The court agreed with the trial court that the Township’s
rezoning of plaintiff’s property was “arbitrary, capricious and
83
unreasonable.” The majority also noted that “[a]lthough the MLUL
does not define either spot zoning or inverse spot zoning, both concepts
are imbedded in the principles of sound and comprehensive planning
84
that pervade that statutory frameworkFalse” The court did not think the
post-Petlin adoption of the MLUL implied it must reach a different
85
result.
In agreeing with the trial court that the Township’s zoning
amendment was inverse spot zoning, the court found that a combination
86
of multiple factors made this case an instance of inverse spot zoning.
In essence, the court underscored that the zoning change made the
plaintiff’s property difficult to develop, that the plaintiff could no longer
implement a site plan that was wholly in accord with the original zoning
designation, that the change was driven by neighboring property
owners, and that the new zoning designation was not created for that
87
part of town and did not further a comprehensive plan. The court
further noted that the Township took action without the advice of expert
88
planners or consultants.
Nevertheless, the court maintained it was not implying that it is
never proper to revise the zoning for what is essentially “the last
undeveloped parcel in a town or in a discrete geographic area of a
89
municipality.” The majority asserted that a municipality could revise
the zoning during a reexamination of the Master Plan or through the
90
MLUL’s inconsistency option. According to the majority, the MLUL’s
requirement that the governing body articulate the reasoning behind its
departure from its Master Plan “serves to prevent the municipality from
91
acting in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.”
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 192-93.
See id. at 195.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197.
See discussion of Petlin, supra Part I(b).
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 198.
Id.
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In a dissent joined by Justice Long, Justice Albin accused the court
of “substitut[ing] its own ‘equitable’ judgment for a lawfully-enacted
zoning ordinance addressing public safety and quality-of-life issues of
92
concern to South Brunswick’s residents.” Justice Albin argued that the
MLUL exhibits the Legislature’s policy of providing municipalities
with the necessary “breathing space” to fine-tune their zoning in the
93
face of “changing circumstances.” The dissent asserted that the
language allowing amendments inconsistent with the Master Plan
reflects a recognition that zoning may be imperfect or need to “evolve
to meet a community’s changing conditions and needs,” and that a
Master Plan should not be “a straitjacket that forbids a municipality
94
from improving its laws.” He also stressed that the Legislature vested
the democratically elected governing bodies of municipalities with the
zoning power and only required that use of that power comply with the
95
terms of the statute.
Justice Albin additionally contended that the court should not have
invoked the doctrine of inverse spot zoning here because the instant
96
case differs from Petlin in two noteworthy ways. The dissent first
noted that Petlin was decided seventeen months before the existence of
97
the MLUL. Because the predecessor to the MLUL did not expressly
allow a municipality to enact a zoning amendment “inconsistent with a
[M]aster [P]lan,” Justice Albin asserted that the Petlin decision may
98
have limited value in deciding more recent cases.
Secondly, the dissent argued that Petlin’s facts were not similar to
99
the case at hand. In Petlin, the court found the municipality’s actions to
be inverse spot zoning because it gave no real consideration to the
property’s place in the town’s comprehensive zoning plan and the
municipality simply designed the zoning changes to alter the use of
100
plaintiff’s land. Here, South Brunswick took the time to determine
whether the zoning revision would further the Township’s
comprehensive development, as well as the health, safety and welfare of
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 200 (Albin, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. at 205 (Albin, J., dissenting).
Id.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 205 (Albin, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting Petlin Assocs. v. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 331 (1974)).
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101

its inhabitants.
Additionally, the court in Petlin considered the rezoning
questionable on its face because the Township completely disregarded
102
the opinion of its own planning engineer. The dissent highlighted that
South Brunswick’s Director of Planning and Community Development,
on the other hand, opined that the amendment would “clearly lead to
enhanced protection of the health, safety and welfare of [area]
103
residents.” Furthermore, the South Brunswick governing body was
plainly responding to the potentially harmful impact of the original
104
zoning designation on the nearby residential development.
Justice Albin further questioned the “source of authority” for the
inverse spot zoning doctrine and averred that judicially created
105
doctrines that are equitable in nature “must give way to statutory law.”
Lastly, the dissent asserted that because a court cannot override the
Legislature’s grant of authority to municipalities based merely on its
own conception of fairness, the MLUL allows a zoning change that is
inconsistent with the Master Plan to stand so long as it is rationally106
based.
III. RIYA FINNEGAN’S TRANSFORMATION OF THE INVERSE
SPOT ZONING DOCTRINE
This Part examines the historical context of inverse spot zoning
and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of the doctrine in Riya
Finnegan. The first subpart finds that despite the fact that the inverse
spot zoning doctrine developed in response to the zoning practices of an
earlier era, the doctrine can still be relevant in determining whether a
zoning action was arbitrary or capricious. The second subpart further
concludes that the court’s revitalization of the inverse spot zoning
doctrine breathes greater life into New Jersey land use jurisprudence by
providing courts with more guidance.
a.

The Historical Context of Inverse Spot Zoning

Spot zoning doctrine principally evolved during the early era of
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id. (quoting Petlin Assocs. v. Twp. of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 331 (1974)).
Id.
Riya Finegan, 197 N.J. at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
Id.
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zoning regulation when municipal governments began facing challenges
to ad hoc zoning practices that resulted from the states’ original zoning
107
statutes. One problem with the states’ early zoning legislation arose
108
from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act itself. Although the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which states began enacting in the
1920s, commanded that zoning be “consistent with a comprehensive
plan,” the Act failed to explain both the meaning of that phrase and the
109
term “consistent.” Additionally, there were few professional planners
during the 1920s and 1930s, and a relatively small number of genuinely
comprehensive plans, so that early decisions defined the term
110
“comprehensive plan” quite loosely. Because it was fairly simple for a
municipality to prove that its zoning was in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, it was also easy for local governments to begin
111
abusing the zoning power through spot zoning.
Another problem with early zoning legislation stemmed from the
lack of a clearly defined relationship between the Standard State Zoning
112
Enabling Act and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. As noted
above, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act required that zoning
113
actions be “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” The Standard
City Planning Enabling Act, on the other hand, required the creation of
a local planning commission whose duty it was to create a Master
114
Plan. These two distinct model laws, however, did not equate the
107

ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, THE COMPREHENSIVE OR MASTER PLAN §
37.03(2) (Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly eds., 2009) [hereinafter MASTER PLAN].
108
See id.
109
Id. § 37.03(1); see also 1 JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE § 14:2
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that courts have construed the requirement of a comprehensive plan
“in several different ways.”).
110
1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, PUBLIC
CONTROL OF PRIVATE LAND § 1:11 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter PUBLIC CONTROL]; MASTER
PLAN, supra note 107, § 37.03(1); see also 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, LIMITATIONS UPON THE SUBSTANCE OF ZONING ORDINANCES §
6:3 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter LIMITATIONS] (“As few of these communities had adopted or
prepared anything resembling a written plan for development, it is not surprising that the
courts did not construe the requirement of a comprehensive plan as one requiring a master
plan formally prepared or adopted.”).
111
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(1).
112
Id. § 37.03(2).
113
Id. (quoting DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3); see
also Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154,
1155 (1955).
114
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(2); see also Haar, supra note 113, at 1155.
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115

phrase “comprehensive plan” with the term “Master Plan.”
Furthermore, the original version of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
116
Act predated the Standard City Planning Enabling Act by six years.
As a result, most local governments adopted zoning ordinances without
117
first preparing a comprehensive plan for community development.
Adding to the confusion, many courts construed the term
“comprehensive plan” as simply referring to a set of zoning ordinances
118
themselves. Therefore, the zoning task preceded and dominated the
planning task so that zoning ordinances became the planning, instead of
serving as a short-term implementation device for a comprehensive
119
long-term land use plan. Moreover, municipalities viewed the Master
Plan as merely advisory and without any legal effect, so that
“consistency and the policy of promoting structured, well organized
development in light of . . . affirmative community goals” was not
120
furthered. Without clear recognition of the need for development
according to a comprehensive plan, the risk that zoning would tyrannize
121
individual landowners increased drastically.
In the 1960s, the desire to eliminate ad hoc zoning and the
“arbitrary and discriminatory” measures it produced increased as
municipal governments confronted numerous challenges to zoning
122
actions brought by local property owners. Many of these complaints
alleged that a zoning ordinance or revision constituted impermissible
123
spot zoning. By the 1970s, however, the era of contemporary land use
124
controls began to develop. This new era evolved not only from the
115

MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.
1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN & KENNETH H. YOUNG, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,
MUNICIPAL P LANNING AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN § 5:1 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
MUNICIPAL PLANNING].
117
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107; see also PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 110, § 1:18
(observing that “communities are quick to adopt zoning ordinances, but less anxious to
develop a plan”).
118
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107; see also PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 111 § 1:18
(“The courts have generally assumed the existence of a plan, or have detected the essence of
a plan in the zoning ordinance itself.”).
119
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.
120
Id.
121
Haar, supra note 113, at 1158.
122
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.
123
Id.
124
Id. § 37.03(3)(a); see also 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING, BACKGROUND OF POLICE POWER AND ZONING REGULATION § 1:13
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that numerous states amended their zoning enabling acts during the
116
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concerns of the 1960s, but also in response to the improved
125
sophistication of the planning profession. In addition, environmental
issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s led states to establish pollution
control programs that eventually developed into state-controlled land
126
use programs.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the state’s role in land use
development continued to increase along with statutory, administrative,
and judicial consideration of the requirement that land use controls be
127
consistent with a comprehensive plan. Today, most municipalities
have both a professional planner and a Master Plan embodying the
comprehensive plan of the community, or have at least had one in the
128
past. Thus, there is now a greater expectation that municipalities take
the time to develop a comprehensive plan for their communities and
129
then adhere to that plan in making zoning decisions.
In New Jersey, the official beginning of contemporary zoning
130
practices took place after the Legislature enacted the MLUL in 1975.
The legislative history of the MLUL illustrates that, prior to its
enactment, New Jersey had yet to update the zoning enabling legislation
131
passed in 1928. The drafters developed the law in response to the
numerous challenges to municipal zoning actions faced by local
132
governments. In requiring stricter conformity between zoning actions
and the Master Plan, as well as clarifying other procedural aspects of
133
land use regulation, one of the legislation’s main goals was to
minimize the potential for legal challenges to local zoning actions, such
134
as those alleging impermissible spot zoning. Nevertheless, the MLUL

1970s).
125

MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.
Id.; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 124 (noting that zoning efforts intensified during
1960s and 1970s to address new concerns and that various state-administered land use
programs resulted “on the basis that local land regulation was inadequate to manage growth
and achieve environmental objectives.”).
127
MUNICIPAL PLANNING, supra note 116; MASTER PLAN, supra note 107.
128
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(1).
129
Id.
130
See discussion of the MLUL, supra Part II(a).
131
See Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 3 (statement of George Hagermeister,
Chairman, N.J. State League of Municipalities’ Land Use Study Comm.).
132
Id.
133
Statement to S. No. 3054, supra note 45, at 5.
134
Public Hearing, supra note 45, at 9-10 (N.J. 1975) (statement of Stewart M. Hutt,
Gen. Counsel, N.J. Builders Ass’n).
126
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135

itself never mentions spot zoning or inverse spot zoning. Furthermore,
Petlin, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s most extended discussion of
inverse spot zoning, was actually decided approximately seventeen
136
months before the MLUL went into effect.
Nonetheless, although that law eliminated some of the
misunderstandings about zoning that gave rise to the creation of the spot
zoning doctrine, the majority in Riya Finnegan focused on the way in
which inverse spot zoning doctrine is entrenched in “the principles of
137
sound and comprehensive planning” that pervade the MLUL. The
court also stressed that the doctrine emphasizes the arbitrariness of the
municipal decision rather than whether the municipality singled out a
138
particular parcel for beneficial or detrimental treatment. In other
words, the court affirmed that the issue of inverse spot zoning is still
relevant to whether a municipal decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable despite the passage of the MLUL.
b. Interaction with the Arbitrary, Capricious, or Unreasonable
Standard
More recently, courts have moved away from applying the inverse
spot zoning doctrine to zoning challenges and instead solely consider
139
whether a zoning action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Riggs v. Township of Long
Beach, never mentioned the phrase “inverse spot zoning” when it
concluded that an amendment “whose sole purpose . . . was to devalue
140
the property in order to facilitate eminent domain” was unlawful.
Furthermore, many characterize the term “inverse spot zoning” as more
of an epithet than a judicial doctrine, and at least one scholar argues it is
141
a “black spot” on the law in need of removal. Critics believe the
doctrine is unnecessary because courts must invalidate arbitrary or
discriminatory zoning decisions regardless of whether the plaintiff
135

See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 197

(2008).
136

See discussion supra Part I(b); see also Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 205 (Albin, J.,
dissenting).
137
See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197.
138
Id.
139
See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 135-36.
140
36 DAVID J. FRIZELL, N.J. PRACTICE, LAND USE LAW § 3.11.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2008)
(citing Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 612-13 (1988)).
141
See id.; Reynolds, supra note 17, at 137.
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characterizes the action as inverse spot zoning.
However, the majority in Riya Finnegan clarified the doctrine by
concentrating on the arbitrariness of the governing body’s zoning
decision in making its inverse spot zoning determination, essentially
143
treating it as a derivative of the arbitrary or capricious standard.
Invocation of the doctrine, as characterized by the court in Riya
Finnegan, may actually help courts more accurately determine whether
a downzoning was an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the zoning
power. In explaining why the Township’s actions constituted
impermissible inverse spot zoning, the Court cited several factors,
which now provide courts with additional guidance to determine
144
whether a rezoning is arbitrary and thus invalid. These five factors
were the fact that the zoning change made the plaintiff’s property
difficult to develop, that the plaintiff could no longer implement a site
plan that was wholly in accord with the original zoning designation, that
the change was driven by neighboring property owners, that the new
zoning designation was not created for that part of town and did not
further a comprehensive plan, and that the Township took action
145
without the advice of expert planners or consultants.
The fact that the municipality downgraded the zoning of the
plaintiff’s parcel and that neighboring property owners were the driving
force behind this rezoning suggested that majority interests
146
impermissibly dominated individual property rights. The presence of
these facts alone does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the
amendment was arbitrary, but the existence of the other three factors
heightens the inference of arbitrariness. For example, the municipality’s
failure to consult with an expert planner before making a decision
further implied that it was merely adhering to the neighbors’ wishes
rather than making an informed judgment about the needs of the
147
community.
In addition, the plaintiff’s site plan was completely in accord with
the previous zoning ordinance the municipality had enacted as per its
Master Plan, while the new zoning did not further any sort of
142
143
144
145
146
147

See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 134.
See Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197.
See discussion supra Part II(b).
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 197.
Id.
See id.

WYRWAS (DO NOT DELETE)

5/5/2011 7:40 PM

2011

INVERSE SPOT ZONING

535

148

comprehensive plan. Therefore, the municipality’s failure to advance a
comprehensive plan through the zoning amendment also suggested that
the rezoning was improper. Furthermore, although the MLUL allows a
municipality to pass a zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with its
Master Plan, the presence of the other factors suggests that the decision
to rezone inconsistently was impermissible. In short, these factors
provide courts with a greater understanding of when downzoning is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
IV. INVERSE SPOT ZONING DOCTRINE PROMOTES MORE
ACCURACY IN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
This Part discusses the important competing interests at stake in a
zoning challenge and explains the equilibrium struck by the New Jersey
Supreme Court between the broad zoning power granted to
municipalities under the MLUL and judicial intervention. The first
subpart explains the importance of courts striking a proper balance in
protecting both individual property rights and the public interest when
deciding a zoning dispute. The second subpart underscores the way in
which the Riya Finnegan decision achieves this proper balance.
a.

The Competing Interests in Land Use Jurisprudence

The most fundamental competing interests in the field of land use
controls are “the rights of private property owners and the rights of the
149
more general public.” In Riya Finnegan, the court notes that many
zoning and land use issues deal with “balancing vested property rights,
protected by the takings clause, against the larger concerns for the
general good and welfare of the public as expressed through their
150
elected and appointed officials.”
On the one hand, protection of individual property interests serves
151
important functions in society. According to the United States
152
Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown, “[t]he State’s interest in protecting
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
153
highest order in a free and civilized society.” Aside from promoting
148
149
150
151
152
153

See id.
Cordes, supra note 5, at 629.
Riya Finnegan, 197 N.J. at 198.
Cordes, supra note 5, at 638.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
Id. at 471.
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personal autonomy and privacy, sufficient individual property rights are
also necessary to protect real estate investments so that land
154
development is not excessively chilled or discouraged. This is because
land development can lead to valuable resources, such as housing and
155
commercial uses, which, in turn, lead to jobs, goods, and services.
On the other hand, broader social and public interests have always
156
limited individual property rights. Nuisance principles, which courts
have used to check individual property rights since the early common
law, hold that “a landowner cannot use property in such a way as to
157
harm the property rights of another.” This is so because the effects of
property use unavoidably outstretch property lines and frequently clash
with other nearby property uses, thereby requiring a reasonable
158
accommodation of interests. In fact, restrictions on property rights,
such as zoning, actually enhance the property interests of many
individuals because “[t]o the extent a property owner values the
protection from conflicting uses more than the loss of development
159
opportunities, there is a sum gain.” The United States Supreme Court
has noted this in its references to the principle of reciprocity, “which in
part recognizes that regulations often have reciprocal burdens and
160
benefits.”
Both the competing interests of promoting the general welfare
through property restrictions and protecting individual property rights
serve significant societal functions. Thus, it is particularly important
that cases challenging municipal zoning actions be decided
competently, so that courts do not improperly subordinate either
individual property rights or the public interest. The New Jersey
Supreme Court’s discussion of inverse spot zoning in Riya Finnegan
furthers this goal by providing courts with greater clarity with respect to
deciding whether a municipal zoning action arbitrarily imposes a burden
161
on a property owner.

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

(2008).

Cordes, supra note 5, at 640.
Id.
Id.
Id.; PUBLIC CONTROL, supra note 110, § 1:2.
Cordes, supra note 5, at 640.
Id. at 645-46.
Id. at 646.
See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 198-99
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Balancing Local Zoning Authority and Judicial Safeguards

A Master Plan is the result of extensive and carefully executed
background studies of a community, which means that any zoning
action inconsistent with that plan may be “inconsistent with the
162
community’s own judgment about its future.” However, the objective
of zoning and the Master Plan “is not to place the municipality in a
zoned strait-jacket, but rather to give direction and control to the course
163
of its development.”
As noted earlier, the MLUL requires
municipalities to reexamine and update their Master Plans at least every
164
six years. However, this may not necessarily provide municipalities
with the needed flexibility. Therefore, it may be necessary and
beneficial for a municipality to exercise its zoning power to amend a
zoning ordinance in order to achieve the community’s long-term
165
goals.
The New Jersey Legislature, through the MLUL, thus recognizes
166
the importance of some flexibility in zoning. Unlike the traditional
approach to zoning, the New Jersey approach acknowledges that
circumstances can change by allowing local governments, for good
167
cause, to act inconsistently with their Master Plan. Nevertheless, “the
168
line between flexibility and arbitrariness is a narrow one.” For that
reason, the MLUL also safeguards against arbitrariness by requiring that
a municipality attach a resolution setting forth its reasoning for any
169
inconsistency with the Master Plan. This requirement should make it
clear to a court that a revision is not arbitrary or capricious, but rather
170
“represents considered legislative judgment.”
Nonetheless, the Riya Finnegan decision makes it evident that a
municipality’s zoning decision may still be invalid, even if the
municipality complied with the technical requirements of the MLUL in
171
passing a zoning ordinance inconsistent with its own Master Plan. The
162

MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(ff).
Note, “Spot Zoning” — A Vicious Practice or a Community Benefit, 29 FORDHAM L.
REV. 740, 748 (1961).
164
See discussion supra Part II(a).
165
See Note, supra note 163.
166
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2009).
167
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(q).
168
Haar, supra note 113, at 1169.
169
MASTER PLAN, supra note 107 § 37.03(3)(y).
170
See id. § 37.03(3)(ff).
171
See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 197 N.J. 184, 192-93
163
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decision further confirms that a municipality cannot simply cite generic
concerns without any support as to the basis for a zoning amendment,
and that the courts will invalidate a zoning action as arbitrary or
capricious if “the reasons expressed by the governing body for its
172
decision to rezone [a] parcel fall short.”
Ostensibly, Section 62(a) of the MLUL grants each municipality
broad zoning power because local governing bodies are in the best
position to analyze their community’s land use situation and to fine-tune
their Master Plan by making any necessary adjustments. Of course, it is
also true that there may be valid reasons for mistrusting municipal
zoning amendments. Despite the existence of New Jersey’s Open Public
173
Meetings Act, some still believe that zoning decisions “are frequently
made behind closed doors and only opened to the public after a majority
of the governing body has already ‘informally’ agreed to approve the
zone change,” leaving individual property owners with little influence at
174
public hearings. Consequently, judicial intervention may be necessary
to protect individual property interests.
Because judicial intervention encourages courts to second-guess
local officials and substitute their own judgment for local zoning
decisions, it is also important that courts not have undue power to
overturn municipal zoning enactments. By providing a gloss on the
arbitrary or capricious standard and by giving New Jersey courts more
guidance, the majority’s use of the inverse spot zoning doctrine in Riya
Finnegan to overturn a local zoning amendment promotes better
decision-making by courts in land use decisions. Therefore advances the
policy of striking a proper balance between individual property rights
and the public interest.
However, had recent legislation existed in New Jersey prior to the
Riya Finnegan decision, the court would not have even heard the case.
Under the current “Time of Decision Rule,” “a planning board or
(2008).
172

See id. at 193.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-6 to -21 (West 2009). Under the Act, also known as “The
Sunshine Law,” “no public body shall hold a meeting unless adequate notice thereof has
been provided to the public.” Id. § 10:4-9. The term “public body” means a group of two or
more persons, “empowered as a voting body to perform a public governmental function
affecting the rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits, or other legal relations of any
person, or collectively authorized to spend public funds including the Legislature.” Id. §
10:4-8. The Act’s requirements do not apply to the judicial branch, juries, the Parole Board,
the State Commission of Investigation or any political party. Id.
174
See Daines, supra note 1.
173
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zoning board of adjustment applies the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision rather than the law in effect when the issues were
175
initially presented.” Thus, a governing body can revise its zoning
ordinance in direct response to an application for development and
176
resolve the matter under the amended ordinance.
On May 5, 2010, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed a bill
into law that would effectively prevent a municipality from amending
177
its zoning laws in response to an application. Under the new law,
which is to take effect within one year of enactment, a board must
decide an application for development in accordance with the land use
regulations that were in effect when the landowner submitted his or her
178
application. Because of this law’s enactment, inverse spot zoning
cases, like Riya Finnegan, are unlikely to arise in the future. Thus, the
victory for land use jurisprudence found in Riya Finnegan may have
come too late for New Jersey courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the MLUL has since eradicated the misunderstandings
about zoning that led to the development of the inverse spot zoning
doctrine, the Riya Finnegan decision shows that the doctrine can still be
relevant to determining whether a municipal zoning action was arbitrary
or capricious. Zoning requires a delicate balancing of individual rights
against the welfare of the community as a whole. However, it can be
difficult to determine whether a zoning revision arbitrarily burdens one
of these two conflicting interests. By providing courts with additional
guidance for determining when a municipal zoning amendment is
arbitrary or capricious, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s revitalization
of the inverse spot zoning doctrine promotes better decision-making by
New Jersey courts faced with zoning challenges.
Because zoning requires a difficult balancing of important
175
S. Cmty. and Urban Affairs Comm.: Statement to S. No. 82, 2010 Leg., 214th Sess.
(N.J. 2010), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/82_S1.PDF;
Christopher DeGrezia, Time’s Up for Time of Decision Rule, N.J. ZONING & LAND USE LAW
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.njlandlaw.com/archives/776.
176
DeGrezia, supra note 174.
177
See 2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/2010/Bills/PL10/9_.PDF; see also S. 82, 2010 Leg., 214th Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/82_I1.PDF.
178
2010 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 9, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010
/Bills/PL10/9_.PDF.
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individual and collective interests and raises constitutional concerns, it
is important for courts to strike a proper balance in deciding zoning
challenges. In order to serve these interests, courts must also weigh the
broad zoning authority granted to municipalities against the importance
of judicial intervention when individual rights are threatened. In
providing New Jersey courts with more guidance for deciding zoning
challenges, the majority’s renewal of inverse spot zoning doctrine not
only aids courts in applying the arbitrary or capricious standard, but also
promotes greater harmonization between individual property rights and
the public interest.

